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he problem of the Holodomor in Ukraine is 
among the most complicated both in Ukrainian 
and in foreign historiography. Active research 
into the Great Famine in large measure spans only the 
post-Soviet period, since, as we know, the question “did 
not exist” in Soviet historiography. In studying such an 
important (and for the Ukrainian people painful) problem, 
historical sources possess a special significance and their 
unprejudiced analysis and interpretation is the duty of 
every historian. The initiation of the process leading to 
the declassification of archival information, which took 
place at different times in the various successor states of 
the Soviet empire, made it possible for a documentary 
substratum to be created for an objective study of the 
tragic pages of our history. Now there is no reason 
to complain that the necessary source materials are 
unavailable.
True, here one might mention the loss of some 
archival fonds or aggregates of documents, and the 
limiting of access to individual archives, fonds, or 
documents.
Generally, however, the documentary pub-
lications and collections of oral history, which 
have been appearing for more than 15 years now 
in Ukraine and the Russian Federation, provide a 
graphic representation of the political, economic, 
national, and social components of the Holodomor- 
Genocide in Ukraine. Nevertheless, difficulties arise with 
the interpretation of historical sources, particularly in the 
context of the Ukrainian-Russian scholarly discussion of 
this issue with its obvious political subtext. The archival 
information now available, as well as that which has yet 
to come to light, demands competent evaluation. The 
researcher who aspires to reveal the truth should turn to 
the primary sources, to archival information, at the same 
time bearing in mind that, for the most part, the most 
striking documents have already been published.
Archival documentation containing information on 
the Holodomor is held in the state archives of Ukraine,1 
as well as the archives of governmental entities in 
states that were directly related to its organization, or
1. See: R. Ia. Pyrih, “Dokumenty z istorii' holodu u fondakh 
arkhivoskhovyshch Ukrainy,” Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 5
(2003): 82-101.
which provided relief to starving Ukrainians, or those 
which became a second homeland to post-World War 
II Ukrainian emigrants. Perhaps the largest number of 
documents in terms of volume is to be found in the federal 
and local archives of the Russian Federation, which hold 
documents of all-Union state and Party organs, as well 
as their leading figures, that is, those who bore personal 
responsibility for the Ukrainian tragedy.
A large number of the documents accessible 
to researchers are already in scholarly circulation; 
Ukrainian and foreign scholars are actively using the 
information they provide in their specialized works. A 
large aggregate of documents has been made available 
in some fundamental publications.2 Concise data on 
the informational resources of the Russian Federation's 
archives regarding Holodomor issues have been supplied 
by V. Marochko3 and H. Kapustian,4 while D. Khubova5 
has consulted the Holodomor's oral history.
All the same, it remains imperative that a detailed 
examination be conducted of the information bearing 
on the Holodomor in Ukraine that has accumulated in
2. Dokumenty svidetel'stvuiut. Iz istorii derevni nakanune i 
v khode kollektivizatsii 1927-1932 gg., ed V. P. Danilov and N. A. 
Ivanitskii (Moscow: Izd. Polit. literatury, 1989), 526 pp.; Stalins- 
koe Politbiuro v 1930 gg. Sbornik dokumentov, compiled by O. V. 
Khlevniuk et al. (Moscow, 1995), 340 pp.; Tragediia sovetskoi derev- 
ni. Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie. 1927-1939. Dokumenty i mate- 
rialy. V 5-ti tt. Tom 1: Mai 1927—noiabr' 1929, edited by V. Danilov 
et al. (Moscow, 1999), 880 pp. Tom 3: Konets 1930-1933 (Moscow, 
2001); Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska. 1931-1936, compiled by O.
V Khlevniuk et al. (Moscow, 2001), 798 pp; V Vasyl'ev and Iu. 
Shapoval, eds., Komandyry velykoho holodu: Poizdka V. Molotova 
i L. Kahanovycha v Ukrainu ta na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932—1933 
(Kyiv: Heneza, 2001); Lubianka. Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD. 
Arkhiv Stalina. Dokumenty vysshikh organov partiinoi i gosudarst- 
vennoi vlasti. Ianvar' 1922-dekabr' 1936 g., edited by A. N. Iakovlev, 
compled by V. N. Khaustov et al. (Moscow: MFD, 2003), 912 pp.
3. V. I. Marochko, “Rosiis'ki arkhivni dzherela ta zbirnyky 
dokumentiv pro prychyny ta obstavyny holodomoru.” In Holod 1932-
33 v Ukraini: Prychyny ta naslidky, ed. V. M. Lytvyn (Kyiv: Naukova 
Dumka, 2003), 41-50.
4. Halyna Kapustian, “Holodomor 1932-33 r.r. v Ukraini za 
materialamy moskovs'kykh arkhiviv.” In Try holodomory v Ukraini 
v XX st.: Pohliad iz s'ohodennia. Materialy Mizhnarodnoi naukovoi 
konferentsii (Kyiv: Ukrains'ka vydavnycha spilka, 2003), 87-109.
5. D. N. Khubova, “Chernye doski: tabula rasa golod 1932-
33 godov v ustnykh svidetel'stvakh,” in Golod 1932-1933 godov. 
Sbornik statei, edited by Iu. N. Afanas'ev (Moscow: RGGU, 1995), 
67-88.
Russian institutions of memory (archives, museums, 
libraries), while a thematic analysis of such historical 
sources might well become a separate project. The 
present survey was carried out as an attempt to 
distinguish the aggregate of documented history bearing 
on the “organization” of the Holodomor in Ukraine in 
1932-33 within the context of a broader theme, namely, 
“Archival Ucrainica in the Russian Federation.”
The documents bearing information that directly 
or indirectly reflects different aspects of the problem 
are concentrated in the State Archive of the Russian 
Federation, the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political 
History, the Russian State Archive of the Economy, the 
Russian State Military Archive, the Russian State Archive 
of Literature and Art, the Archive of the President of the 
Russian Federation, the Central Archive of the Federal 
Security Service of Russia, as well as the governmental 
archives of the Briansk, Voronezh, Novosibirsk, and 
Sverdlovsk oblasts, the Krasnodar and Primorskoy krais, 
the Center for Documentation of the Recent History of 
the Krasnodar krai, and the Kursk and Voronezh oblast 
State Archives of Socio-Political History.
The nature, form, and contents of these documents 
were determined by the function they were intended to 
perform, as well as by the authority and duties of the 
bodies whose activities generated them. Direct evidence 
regarding the organization of a “man-made” famine 
among the peasantry is to be found in documents of 
an official provenance: legislative and other normative 
acts; minutes of meetings and decisions of the Politburo 
CC CPSU (Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union) and Party organs of various 
levels; stenographic reports of congresses, plenums,
consultations, devoted to questions bearing on all
aspects of the grain-delivery campaigns of 1931-33; 
diplomatic documents reflecting the international 
context of the problem; documents resulting from 
actions of the government's executive organs; special 
bulletins; circulars; informational summaries; records 
of interrogations; official correspondence; documents of 
personal origin; auto-communicative documents (diaries, 
memoirs); personal letters; and oral history.
Documentation that reflects the problem or its 
individual aspects indirectly might include the statistics 
which record the dynamics of mortality rates; documents 
from bodies which organized and effected the export of 
grain; documents generated by activities of transport 
firms involved in grain export; documents that reflect 
the deportation and re-settlement of peasants from 
Ukraine and the Kuban; etc. The majority of documents 
is classified “Confidential” or “Secret.”
A more detailed examination of documents dealing 
with the Holodomor-Genocide to be found in the basic 
Russian state archives follows.
The Russian State Archive of Socio-Political 
History
This archive was formed out of the previous Central 
Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of 
the CC CPSU and, in consequence, inherited holdings 
that are especially valuable for study of the Holodomor 
in Ukraine. Here have also been deposited part of the 
fonds from the Archive of the President of the Russian 
Federation. Of the 689 fonds in the archive, of particular 
interest are the CC CPSU fond (f. 17), and the personal 
fonds of Joseph Stalin (f. 558), Lazar Kaganovich (f. 
81), and Viacheslav Molotov (f. 82).
The CC CPSU fond holds documents of the 
collective CC organs: the Plenums, Politburo, Orgburo, 
the CC Secretariat and apparat. Here are minutes of 
meetings, stenographic reports, decisions of the CC 
VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)], 
also official correspondence regarding organization of 
grain delivery. The Ukrainian aspect is clearly reflected, 
particularly in the following decisions of the CC VKP(b) 
and the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR:
(a) On grain delivery in Ukraine, the North 
Caucasus, and in the Western oblast dated December 14, 
1932. This authorized the deportation of peasants to the 
North (and also the Communists who failed to squeeze 
grain out of them). It forbade Ukrainianization in the 
Kuban and called, as something not to be delayed, for 
the Ukrainian language in official dealings and the mass 
media to be replaced by Russian, that being the language 
“more understood by the Kuban population.”
(b) On Ukrainianization in the Far Eastern krai, 
Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Central Chernozem 
oblast, and other regions of the USSR, dated December 
15, 1932, intended by autumn, 1933, to convert the press 
and educational institutions to the Russian language, thus 
forbidding their native tongue to Ukrainians re-settled in 
these regions.
(c) On grain delivery in Ukraine, dated December 19, 
1932. This decision pointed to the “unserious attitude” 
of the Ukrainian leaders to the grain-delivery campaign, 
and sent Kaganovich and Pavel Postyshev to Ukraine.
These official documents are currently in scholarly 
circulation both in works of historical research and in 
published collections: Holod 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini: 
ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv (The Famine of 
1932-1933 in Ukraine: through the eyes of historians, 
and the language of documents, Kyiv 1990); Komandyry 
velykoho holodu (Commanders of the Great Famine, 
Kyiv 2001), and others. In this fond are also deposited 
copies of similar decisions of the Council of People's 
Commissars of the Ukr SSR and the CC CP(b)Ukraine. 
An example is the bitterly familiar decision, dated
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December 6, 1932, “On entering on the black board 
[blacklist] those villages that maliciously sabotage grain 
delivery” (op. 26, spr. 550). In this group of documents 
might also be included the decision of the Dnipropetrovs'k 
obkom CP(b)Ukraine, “On undertakings in the struggle 
against famine,” dated February 10, 1933, where, in 
addition, there are facts on death by starvation even of 
collective farmers who had a large number of trudodni 
[workdays] to their credit.
Materials related to plenums and decisions of the 
CC VKP(b) testify to the role of the Party leadership in 
the organization of the Famine and the destruction of the 
Ukrainian peasantry. The People's Commissariat of Trade 
was directed on August 30, 1930, to draw up and submit 
to the Politburo plans for fulfilling obligations related to 
the export of grain, and providing specific responsibilities 
for the “grain-producing regions (Ukraine, the Trans- 
Caucasus and others).”6 Personal responsibility for grain 
shipment to the ports was placed on the Secretary of the 
CC CP(b)U, Stanislav Kosior.
The decision of May 10, 1931, “On the Grain 
Balance,” obligated Party committee secretaries to begin 
shipping grain from the “interior raions” and, within 
ten days, to send out of Ukraine 25,000 tons of grain 
to Moscow and 9,000 tons to the Crimea; and, within 
twenty days, 5,000 tons of flour to the Transcaucasus.7 
A check by “sampling” of available grain reserves in the 
storage facilities of Souzkhlib and of cooperatives was 
entrusted to the OGPU.8
According to a decision regarding special settlers,” 
dated July 10, 1931, deportees were to be placed in 
the former Kherson okruha (in Kakhovka raion—400 
families; in Khorly—800, in Skadovs'k—400; Hola 
Prystan'—300; Heniches'k —350). In the Novovasylivka, 
Novotroits'ke, and the Akymovs'k raions of the former 
Melitopol okruha, it was planned to settle 250 families 
in each.9
The familiar decision of October 30, 1932, “On 
steps for the intensification of grain deliveries,” obligated 
obkoms to institute a daily review and operational 
control over the fulfillment of grain-delivery plans and 
to submit reports every five days to the CC CP(b)U. 
Further, to “assist” the obkoms, it dispatched prominent 
Party figures into the field accompanied by not less 
than 100 leading workers from the central organs. The 
grain- delivery plan for November was set at 90,000,000 
poods.10
Information on which a general picture might 
be based is provided by the Plenum of the CC of the
6. RGASPI, f. 17, op., 162, d. 9, l. 21-22.
7. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1935, l. 7-9.
8. Ibid., f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, l. 35.
9. Ibid., op. 162, d. 10, l. 116-18.
10. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 26, d. 54, l. 192-97.
Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, which took 
place October 30-31, 1931. The noose on the Ukrainian 
peasantry's neck was being tightened by the hand of S. 
Kosior. He called the grain-delivery plan for Ukraine of 
510,000,000 poods (greater than that for other republics) 
“unreservedly realistic and possible to fulfill, without any 
particular sacrifice on the part of the collective peasantry 
and the Ukrainian village generally.”11 For comparison, 
the plan for Belarus called for 10,500,000 poods; for 
the northern Caucasus, 200,000,000; for Kazakhstan, 
55,000,000, etc.
The archival fond of Kaganovich, the “200 
percent” Stalinist, contains documents (431 items) that 
characterize all aspects of his activity from 1918 to 1957. 
He had been secretary of the CC All-UnionCP(b) and 
from December 15 oversaw the agricultural department 
of the CC. The nature of the documents in his personal 
fond is quite varied. These are biographical documents, 
drafts, theses, stenographic records of reports and 
speeches at congresses of the RCP(b)-All-UnionCP(b)- 
CPSU at plenums of the CC and the CCC, consultations 
and other meetings, drafts of resolutions of Party forums, 
summaries of Party purge results, preparatory materials 
and manuscripts of newspaper articles, appointment 
books, correspondence with central and local Party 
organizations and leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet 
government, letters and notations with resolutions and 
comments by Stalin. In the context of the problem 
being studied, of particular interest is Kaganovich's 
correspondence with Stalin and Molotov; documents on 
his trip to the Donbas in April, 1933; documents about 
the creation of political sections in the MTS, decisions
and directives on agriculture (1930-1932), brief diary
entries and stenographic records of his speeches during
trips to Ukraine (1932-1934).
One of his diaries (f. 81, op. 3, d. 215, l. 1-24) records 
the progress of his trip to Ukraine on April 22-29, 1932). 
This senior Soviet office-holder found that in Kyiv a 
counter-revolutionary organization involving lecturers 
and students had been rendered harmless; “wreckers” 
had been unmasked at the Ukrainian Tractor Center; 
insurgent groups of Polish descent identified. These 
facts testify to the existence of systemic repression. The 
diary mentions a new form for influencing the peasants: 
“insistent discussion” of OGPU workers with the head of 
a collective farm and members of the farm's executive. 
Some idea of the forms this discussion took might 
be gleaned from unofficial correspondence and oral 
accounts. The summary included this directive: grain, 
including the seed, must be delivered without any delay; 
700 families must be expelled from Dnipropetrovs'k 
oblast; 1,000 homesteads in Kharkiv oblast to be deprived 
of property, homes, land; 500 in Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
11. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 484, l. 43-44.
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Another “Ukrainian” diary, this one covering 
April 10-20, 1933, (f. 81, op. 3, d. 216) is an account 
of Kaganovich's trip to the Don region. Collective 
farmers' “unsatisfactory work” was the reason for failure 
to fulfill the grain-delivery plan. Horses dropped dead of 
disease because of “poor management, bad care.” The 
possibility for improvement lay in the intensification of 
Party control. “The political section must have an agent, 
an informer in every collective farm, in every field and in 
every brigade” (f. 81, op. 3, d. 181-193). Behind every 
comment in the diary stand dozens and hundreds of 
mutilated lives.
Kaganovich's diaries of his trips to the North 
Caucasus on November 1-8, 1932; January 30-February 
5, 1933 (f. 81, op. 3, d. 215); June 20-24, 1933 (f. 81, 
op. 3, d. 216); and July 20-24, 1933 (f. 81, op. 3, d. 216) 
testify to the cynicism of those who organized the famine 
and the consistency with which they implemented their 
plans. They emphasize the “great resistance to the 
grain deliveries” in Krasnodar krai, and clearly state 
the primary political goal—to break that resistance, 
beginning with raikom secretaries and ending with rank- 
and-file collective farmers.
In terms of its bearing on the problem examined 
here, no less an important component of the Kaganovich 
archive is his correspondence with Stalin during 1931-
1936, in which he was the main addressee. The body 
of this correspondence containing Stalin's mostly terse 
directions and Kaganovich's brief communications, 
lengthy commentary and detailed reports was 
published in 2001 by the Russian State Archive of 
Socio-Political History as part of the Yale University 
“Annals of Communism” project.12 Individual letters 
have appeared in other publications, in particular, 
Komandyry velykoho holodu: Poizdky V. Molotova i L. 
Kahanovycha v Ukrainu ta na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-
1933 (Commanders of the Great Famine: Travels of L. 
Kaganovich and V. Molotov to Ukraine and the North 
Caucasus. 1932-1933, Kyiv 2001); “Tragediia sovetskoi 
derevni. Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie. 1927-1939: 
Dokumenty i materialy. V 5-ti tt./T. 3” (The Tragedy of 
the Soviet Village. Collectivization and Dekulakization. 
1927-1939. 5 Volumes, Vol. 3, Moscow 2002).
In the personal fond of Viacheslav Molotov 
(Skriabin) there are 1,712 items for 1907-1986. In the 
autumn of 1932 Molotov headed the Ukrainian Special 
Commission, created by Stalin's directive to intensify 
activities related to grain delivery. In his fond are to 
be found texts of his reports and speeches during his 
travels in Ukraine (1928, 1932-1933), particularly on 
deliveries in the USSR and Ukraine (December, 1931- 
January 1931; October-November, 1932). There is
12. Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska, 1931-1936, compiled by O. 
V. Khlevniuk, et al. (Moscow, 2001).
correspondence with Stalin and other Soviet leaders, 
CC CP(b)U materials on deliveries, statistical data 
about the situation in Ukraine,13 letters to Stalin from V. 
Chubar, Head of the Council of People's Commissars of 
the Ukrainian SSR, and from H. Petrovs'kyi, Head of 
the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, about 
famine in Ukraine.
The dimensions of the Ukrainian tragedy are 
particularly evident from a report submitted to Molotov 
by M. Chernov, Deputy Head of the Committee on 
Deliveries, Council on Labor and Defense, which dealt 
with the extent to which Ukraine was supplied with 
foodstuffs. Chernov states: “The overall need in Ukraine 
for grain for the second quarter, according to the supply 
plan, is 410,000 tons in grain measure, or 136,000 
tons monthly. On April 1, Ukraine had 80,000 tons of 
commercial resources and in April 55,000 tons were 
released from the NEP fond.”14 Even making allowance 
for the fact that numbers given in Party documents were 
often inaccurate, the extent to which the survival of 
Ukrainians was in peril is obvious.
The letters to Stalin from Vlas Chubar and Heorhii 
Petrovs'kyi, both dated June 10, 1932, are generally 
already known. Despite the taboo surrounding the 
word “hunger,” they both contain information that left 
no reason to doubt the tragic nature of the situation in 
Ukraine.
As a result of visits to thirteen raions in Kyiv 
oblast and four in Vinnytsia oblast, Chubar, obviously 
downplaying the proportions of the tragedy, informed 
Stalin that: “from March-April those who did not have 
enough to eat, who starved, swelled, and died of hunger 
could, in every village, be counted in the tens and 
hundreds” (f. 82, op. 2, d. 139). Petrovs'kyi was more 
circumspect in his account. “I was in many villages in 
these raions and everywhere saw that a notable part of 
the village is seized by hunger. Not many, but there are 
also those swollen from hunger, usually the poorest, but 
[including] even the middle peasants. They use such 
substitutes [for food] that couldn't be worse, and even 
those substitutes are sometimes not there” (f. 82, op. 
2, d. 139). Petrovs'kyi predicted that “the famine will 
intensify” and so asked for assistance in the form of 
buckwheat for sowing.
The results of such appeals have been analyzed more 
than once by researchers of the Famine in Ukraine. This 
information is closely tied to accounts provided by f. 17,15 
already placed into circulation by Ukrainian scholars, 
about how on June 26 Chubar personally traveled to
13. See Larysa Malashenko, “Dokumenty osobovykh fondiv L.
Kahanovycha ta V. Molotova iak dzherela vyvchennia istorii' Ukrai'ny
v XX stolitti” in Komandyry velykoho holodu, 194-98.
14. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 13, l. 133.
15. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 13, l. 4.
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Moscow to convince Molotov and Kaganovich to release 
15,000 tons of rye and rice flour for Ukraine from state 
stores.16
Indirect information about the battle of the Soviet 
leadership with the Ukrainian peasantry is given in 
statistical data from July 4-5, 1932, on the amount of 
ploughed land in collective farms; issue of grain to 
sovkhozes and kolkhozes for seeding and consumption in 
1932; on the yield of grain and technical crops in the Ukr 
SSR for 1928-1931; on agricultural productivity in the 
USSR and the Ukr SSR; on the gross harvest of grain in 
the Ukr SSR in 1927-1932; about grain deliveries in the 
USSR and the Ukr SSR in 1927-1932; about fulfillment 
of the grain delivery plan in the USSR by regions in 
1931-1932. These have been gathered in spr. 139 of f. 
82 (op. 2).17 They would, of course, need to be examined 
critically and collated with other sources.
The list of starving raions in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovs'k, 
Vinnytsia, and Kharkiv oblasts (f. 82) with the notation 
that none of these oblasts has fulfilled the grain-delivery 
plan has already appeared in print a number of times. 
The value of these documents is not so much in the 
information about the spread of famine (this is no 
longer new for the scholarly community) as it is in their 
peripheral aspect which testifies to the cynicism of those 
who organized the Holodomor.
Quite informative are the telegrams of October 29 and 
30, 1932, from Molotov to Stalin, on lowering the grain- 
delivery plan for Ukraine. As a result of an examination 
of this matter at a meeting of the CC CP(b)U Politburo 
in which obkom secretaries participated, the plan was 
reduced by 70,000,000 poods. Instead, Molotov proposed 
“directing 50-70 comrades with Party experience, along 
the lines of gubkom and okrugkom secretaries, for one 
month to work on grain delivery.” He also suggested 
using “deprival of a part of consumer goods as a form 
of repression.”18 Implementing these proposals resulted 
in loading on the peasantry the burden of the “Black 
Boards.” Being entered thereon meant that automatically 
all goods would be removed from cooperative stores 
and kolkhoz trade completely forbidden. Already on
16. See Valerii Vasyl'iev, “Tsina holodnoho khliba,” in Koman- 
dyry velykoho holodu, 25.
17. See “Kil'kist' MTS ta ploshcha zoranoi zemli u kolhospakh, 
iaki vony obsluhovuiut' v URSR, za danymy Traktorotsentru SRSR,” 
“Vydavannia zerna radhospam i kolhospam na nasinnia ta prodo- 
volstvo v 1932 r. za danymy Komitetu zahotivel' pry Radi pratsi ta 
oborony SRSR,” “Ploshcha iaroi sivby v 1930-1932 rr. za danymy 
Narkomzemu SRSR,” “Dani Derzhplanu SRSR pro vrozhainist' 
zernovykh ta tekhnichnykh kul'tur v URSR za 1928-1931 rr.,” “Dani 
Tsentralnoho upravlinnia narodnohospodars'koho obliku SRSR pro 
vrozhainist' v SRSR ta URSR,” “Dani pro valovyi zbir zernovykh v 
SRSR ta URSR za 1927-1932 rr.,” “Dani Komitetu zahotivel' SRSR 
pro vykonannia planu khlibozahotivel' raionamy SRSR v 1931-1933 
rr,” in Komandyry velykoho holodu, 215-28.
18. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 141, l. 7.
November 20, 1932, Molotov reported to Stalin by 
telephone that he was led to issue a “directive” that 600 
Communist workers be mobilized from among activists 
in Ukraine's biggest industrial centers to work on grain 
delivery. Other communications from Molotov to Stalin 
(letters, explanatory notes, and others) can be found in 
the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History 
fonds.
The Molotov fond contains reports from the GPU 
Ukr SSR with the signature of the deputy head, Karl 
Karlson. In a report dated December 28, 1931, “On the 
Progress of Grain Delivery in Ukraine,” the systematic 
“under-fulfillment of the delivery plan” is explained 
by the right-opportunistic attitude of the village aktiv 
and raion functionaries, counter-action by “kulaks,” 
ineffective explanatory activities, insufficient delivery 
of consumer goods. Examples are given of the “free- 
thinking” of individual peasants: “They're taking away 
our last bit of grain, all the policies of the government are 
intended to leave us hungry”; or, “The Soviet government 
has brought us to the point where we are forced to run 
away to distant horizons. Obviously, government policy 
is bringing about the destruction of the village.”19
A general picture of how the grain deliveries 
were proceeding in December 1931, is given in the 
next report covering that month. Information provided 
there, about grain being hidden by individual peasants 
and collective farmers, shows that repressive measures 
were implemented [by the authorities] against their own 
people. In only six days in December, 62 investigations 
were initiated against workers in the Soviet apparatus 
for inactivity, poor management, concealing and 
wasting grain.20 A special report “On the Death and 
Mass Slaughter of Livestock” of December 28, 1931, 
tells of the completely unsatisfactory state of livestock 
in the collective farm and individual sectors and cites 
quantitative indicators. As an official version of the 
reason for the situation are proposed: poor administration, 
low level of veterinary services, and unfavorable state of 
feed supplies.
A number of telegrams from Molotov to senior 
officials in Ukraine (f. 82, op. 2, d. 141) testify to a mind-
set prepared to intensify repressive measures for failure 
to fulfill the grain-delivery plan. One such telegram from 
M. Khataiev and V. Molotov, of November 5, 1932, sent 
to obkom secretaries of the CP(b)U demanded: “to impose 
to the extreme appropriate repressions, particularly now, 
when it is indispensable that a decisive turning point in 
grain deliveries be achieved at all costs.”21 A telegram 
from Molotov to Kosior concentrates on the Chernihiv 
region. It is suggested that Mykola Skrypnyk be sent
19. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 138, l. 80-97.
20. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 138, l. 103-114.
21. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 141, l. 18.
40
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
there to apply control. In other telegrams to obkom 
secretaries it was stated that the Chernihiv region was 
bringing shame on the “successes” in grain delivery of 
other oblasts of Ukraine.
The Stalin fond (f. 558) along with other informative 
documents holds one of the most cynical documents of 
this period, namely, the Directive, dated January 27, 
1933, of the CC VKP(b) and the Council of Peoples' 
Commissars USSR on preventing the mass exodus 
of hungry peasants. This document forbids the entry 
of starving Ukrainian peasants into Russian territory 
and orders that “after separating counter-revolutionary 
elements, the rest are to be returned to their place of 
residence” (op. 11, d. 45, l. 109).
Part of Stalin's archive is held in the Archive of 
the President of the Russian Federation. Here one 
finds additional evidence of how the Communist Party 
“cared” for the peasantry, particularly the Ukrainian 
peasantry. Especially eloquent are the materials on 
the progress of investigations into resistance to grain 
deliveries in Orikhov raion of Dnipropetrovsk oblast in 
Ukraine (f. 3, op. 58, d. 380), which have appeared in 
the publication Lubianka. Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU- 
NKVD. Arkhiv Stalina. Dokumenty vysshikh organov 
partiinoi i gosudarstvennoi vlasti. Ianvar' 1922-dekabr' 
1936 g. (Lubianka. Stalin and the VChK-GPU-OGPU- 
NKVD. Stalin archive. Documents of the Higher Organs 
of Party and State Authority. January 1922-December, 
1936, Moscow 2003). Copies of the interrogation of 
those Party leaders accused of undermining the grain- 
delivery plan in 1932 and of witnesses were sent to 
all CC and CCC members and candidates, obkom and 
kraikom secretaries and members of the Narkomzem 
USSR Collegium with an introduction by Stalin. This 
“performance” with its fabricated documentation was 
primarily intended to exert psychological pressure, to 
head off possible manifestations of disobedience.
Some notes from Genrikh Yagoda to Stalin reflect
the process of deportation (here called “the operation”)
of families and individuals from the Kuban (f. 3, op. 30, 
d. 196). According to the documents, in November- 
December, 1932, 4,158 families were expelled to the 
Ural region (where their re-settlement was “looked 
after” by the OGPU); 1,992 families were sent to north 
Kazakhstan and to special settlements. In no document 
is the nationality of the “special re-settlers” mentioned, 
but the name of the stanitsa —Poltavska— that figures in 
many of the documents as a base of Ukrainian counter-
revolution, lends credence to the conclusion that there 
was a notable Ukrainian component among the special 
re-settlers. Other documents also bear this out. The 
draft of an order to the OGPU on the campaign against 
theft of grain, dated July 5, 1933, sent to Stalin by 
Yagoda, anticipated a new wave of arrests, organization
of surveillance by agents, increasing control by the 
OGPU over “unreliable” farmsteads (among which was 
the Novyi Svit commune in Ukraine), review of all cases 
in the course of two weeks (f. 3, op. 57, d. 60). This draft 
led to discussion among those that were to implement 
it but, on September 15, 1933, the CC All-UnionCP(b) 
adopted a decision “On Safeguarding Grain” which 
broadened the OGPU's authority to include organization 
of grain storage.
Letters [to Stalin] from the prominent Russian 
author, Mikhail Sholokhov, have a direct bearing on this 
matter. Sholokhov provided many instances of abuse 
committed against the stanichniki who failed to discern 
the advantage of the collective system: those who 
“disagreed” were beaten, stripped to their underwear and 
confined in storage sheds in January-February; kerosene 
was poured on women's feet and skirts, set alight and 
then put out; they were buried to the waist in the ground; 
given pistols and forced to shoot themselves; made to 
sit on heated stovetops; driven barefoot through the 
snow; forced to drink large quantities of water mixed 
with pork fat, wheat, and kerosene.22 These methods 
of “interrogation” were applied for one reason: to find 
bread that did not exist, thus condemning them to death 
by starvation. In expectation of help from Stalin (or 
intending it as the final argument) in his letter of April 
16, 1933, Sholokhov relates in detail the situation in the 
Veshensk and Verkhnodonsk regions and reports that one 
sees people swollen with hunger everywhere. Promising 
relief, Stalin hinted to Sholokhov that the latter was 
not apprised of many matters, emphasizing that “the 
honorable agriculturalists are not as vulnerable as might 
appear from afar.”23 *Before too long Sholokhov's defense 
of the peasantry was to have a palpable effect on his own 
personal fate.
A great mass of documents with information 
on economic, socio-political, administrative matters 
(including the USSR's social-economic policies 
regarding the countryside) is concentrated in the Russian 
State Archive of the Economy, reorganized in 1992 out 
of the Central State Archive of the National Economy 
of the USSR. In the 2,021 fonds in this archive there 
are more than four million documentary units resulting 
from the activities of people's commissariats, ministries, 
state committees and other organizations which provided 
planning and financing, set standards and directed 
components of the national economy of the former 
USSR.
22. See Pisatel' i vozhd'. Perepiska M. A. Sholokhova s I. V. 
Stalinym. 1931-1950 gody. Sbornik dokumentov iz lichnogo arkhiva I. 
V. Stalina, compiled by Iu. Murin (Moscow: Raritete, 1997), 49-51.




The fond pertaining to the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade of the USSR (f. 413) contains documents for 
1917-1988, among which, given the focus of this paper, 
the “Materials on the Export Activities of the Nar- 
komzovneshtorg [People's Commissariat for Foreign 
Trade]” covering 1932-1933 are particularly of interest. 
Gathered here are statistical data on the export of different 
groups of goods (primarily of agricultural provenance) 
which are an important source for general statements 
and conclusions on the extent to which the peasantry 
was deliberately deprived of the product of its labor. An 
explanatory note to the accounts report of the All-Union 
Society Eksportkhlib for 1932 (op. 13, d. 28) includes 
the basic indicators of its activity, among them those of 
its representatives in Ukraine. The files “References and 
Summaries of the Economic-Planning Administration 
on the Fulfillment of the Plan on Deliveries of Goods 
for Export in the Republics, Oblasts, Krais of the 
USSR and of Narkomzovneshtorg Organizations in 
1933” (op. 13, spr. 595) and also “Reports of All-
Union Societies Rybkonserveksport, Lektekhsyrovyna, 
Mineralsylykateksport, and Plodeksport on fulfillment 
of exports and income in the Fourth Quarter of 1933” 
(op. 12, d. 18401) deal with delivery of goods for export, 
particularly in Ukraine. This last document emphasizes 
that “as a result of the campaign to achieve the export 
plan in the Ukr SSR” a situation was reached by which 
“Party and Soviet organs through their directives 
obligated trade organizations to devote more attention 
to exports.”24 The direct and primary victim of this 
campaign was the Ukrainian peasantry. In the fond are 
also a number of documents relating to the confiscation 
of gold, silver, and diamonds from the populace.
The documents of the All-Union Society for Trade 
with Foreigners “Torgsin” (f. 4333), which existed 
from 1931 to 1936, reflect the process of fulfilling the 
currency plan—the “mobilization” of so-called ritual- 
lifestyle gold (rings, pectoral crosses, earrings, family 
valuables, gold coins of old minting) for the building 
of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station (Dniprohes), the 
Kharkiv, Stalingrad, and Cheliabinsk tractor plants, the 
Magnitobud, and other giants of Soviet economy. As the 
noted Ukrainian scholar, Vasyl' Marochko, has shown, 
in 1933 the All-Ukrainian Torgsin Office, located in 
Kharkiv, collected over 24,000,000 “old-value” rubles.25 
At this same time more than 5,000,000 Ukrainian 
peasants starved to death. Research into documents 
with information on Torgsin's activities is important as 
analysis of the state's repressive policies towards those 
who were feeding it.
Instructions on depriving the population of the 
means of existence are found in the fond of the People's
24. See RGAE, f. 413, op. 12, d. 18401, l. 183.
25. V. Marochko, “Rosiis'ki arkhivni dzherela,” 48.
Commissariat of Supply of the USSR (f. 8043) for 
1930-1934. The document “Information Regarding the 
Progress of the Grain-Delivery Campaign of 1930-1931, 
Based on Materials from Local OGPU Organs” (op. 11, d. 
13) illustrates the nature of this activity in the Ukrainian 
SSR. It describes the punitive and enforcement measures 
used for its “improvement” and shows the fashion in 
which grain deliveries were conducted on the eve of the 
Great Famine. The cynicism of those executing this work 
is highlighted by an amendment by Anastas Mikoian to 
a proposal of the CC CPU regarding changes in a CC 
VKP decision to forbid the seizing of an only cow. 
“We should seize even an only cow if the contract calls 
for it.”26 On the other hand, a report “On the Progress 
of Grain Deliveries” of September 21, 1930, speaks 
of “unpreparedness” to implement “organizational 
measures” and “mobilization of the masses around grain 
deliveries” and the “resistance of the kulak element.”27 In 
the minutes of the “Grain Consultation” that took place 
December 3, 1931, an enjoinder regarding increasing 
delivery of bulk fodder and a stress on the obligation that 
annual plans be met by the set deadline stands out.28 A 
decision reached by the Collegium of the Narkomat for 
Grain and Livestock Sovkhozes of the USSR, July 14, 
1933, calls for an increase in the grain-delivery plans of 
grain sovkhozes in Ukraine by 7,500,000 poods bringing 
the plan for all sovkhozes to 20,700,000 poods.29
The fond of the People's Commissariat of Finance 
of the USSR (f. 7733) has circulars from Narkomfin to 
union republics which state that it is imperative to use 
“decisive” measures to collect the agricultural tax from 
the kulaks, to take the indebted to court, to submit reports 
immediately on the results of this tax-gathering and how 
many had been brought before the law. It is indicated 
here that Ukraine is the most “owing.” having met the 
agricultural tax plan by only 55 percent as of March 
1931.30 “The matter of identifying kulak farmsteads in 
the Ukr[ainian] SSR is especially disgraceful,” according 
to the circular for September 5, 1931. This accusation 
is bolstered by quantitative indicators: in 1930, 22,095 
kulaks were subject to taxes, but 6,456 in 1931.31
Similar information is recorded in the archival fond 
of the Ministry of Grain Products of the USSR (f. 8040). 
Particularly telling is a circular from the Committee for 
Deliveries of the Council of People's Commissars of 
the USSR regarding implementing repressive measures 
against those “not fulfilling the law on grain delivery.” 
Instead, A. Grinevich, Deputy People's Commissar 
for Agriculture sent a report, dated May 3, 1932, to Ia.
26. RGAE, f. 8043, op. 11, d. 15, l. 78.
27. RGAE, f. 8043, op. 11, d. 17, l. 111-12.
28. RGAE, f. 8043, op. 11, d. 46, l. 78.
29. RGAE. f. 8043, op. 6, d. 26, l. 152-56.
30. RGAE, f. 7733, op. 8, d. 192, l. 93-95.
31. Ibid., l. 41-44.
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Iakovlev, People's Commissar for Agriculture (f. 7486 
“Narkomat zemlerobstva SRSR”) reporting famine in 
Zinoviiv raion of Odesa oblast. Here peasants were 
getting “on average” 76 kgs bread per each family 
member for the whole year.” He proposed that assistance 
be provided in foodstuffs for people and for livestock, 
and also to send tractors and trucks.32 A decision, dated 
September 2, 1932, of the Committee for Delivery of 
Agricultural Products recorded a reduction in the annual 
grain-delivery plan for Ukraine by 40,000,000 poods.33
Data about the forced re-settlement in November- 
December, 1933, of 21,000 collective farmers from 
Belarus and Russia to Ukrainian villages whose 
inhabitants had died of hunger, and the settling of Kuban 
stanitsas whose Ukrainian population had succumbed 
to famine by de-mobilized Red Army soldiers, are kept 
in the fond of the All-Union Re-Settlement Committee 
at the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (f. 
5675). The archival information held there reflects the 
activities of the basic initiators of the re-settlement— 
Molotov and Kaganovich. It includes the geography of 
transport movements with re-settlers into Ukraine, the 
places of their distribution (Odesa, Kharkiv, Donets'k, 
Dnipropetrovs'k oblasts) and the reasons for efforts by 
Belarusian and Russian peasants to return home.
Statistical data about the number of victims of 
famine and those that died during epidemics (of typhus, 
diphtheria, scarlet fever) caused by the deterioration in 
sanitary-epidemical conditions in Ukraine in the middle 
1930s are found in materials from the 1937 census (f. 
1562). Information provided by this archive shows that 
in 1932-1933 the rate of mortality was higher than the 
birth rate. Moreover, it showed that the geographical 
center of mortality was in Ukraine which in that period 
accounted for half of all deaths in the USSR.
In the State Archive of the Russian Federation, 
formed in 1992, are concentrated fonds of the USSR's 
higher organs of power and of state administration from 
1917 (other than those now in specialized state archives 
of the federal level, and in departmental archives). In 
these holdings are found documents directly bearing 
on the Holodomor. Among the 26,510 files for the 
period 1917-1940 of the Central Executive Committee 
of the USSR fond (f. 3316), particularly important 
are the minutes and decisions of the Presidium of the 
Central Executive Committee of the USSR stemming 
from reviews of representations by the OGPU and the 
NKVD regarding extension of the term of confinement 
under guard and confiscation of property for 1930-1934; 
citizens' petitions to the Secretariat of the Presidium of 
the Central Executive Committee of the USSR against 
unlawful acts by persons in authority; documents
32. RGAE, f. 558, op. 11, d. 43, l. 60.
33. RGAE, f. 8040, op. 8, d. 1, l. 111.
pertaining to consultations and commissions of the 
Central Executive Committee. Documents from the 
fond of the USSR Council of People's Commissars (f. 
5446), with its 238,025 cases, are of similar content. 
Particularly important are the minutes of meetings and 
the decisions of the Council of People's Commissars 
and the Council of Ministers of the USSR; minutes of 
the broadened sessions of the USSR Council of People's 
Commissars and the USSR Labor and Defense Council, 
decisions of the USSR Council of People's Commissars; 
correspondence related to the sowing campaign (1931); 
documents of the Secret Section for Management of 
Affairs of the USSR Council of People's Commissars on 
the struggle with the kulaks, special re-settlers, etc.
Reports, papers, tables of indicators from inter- 
raion commissions and authorized officials of the State 
Commission on the Progress of the Grain Harvest, 
aggregate tables on the dimensions and dynamics of areas 
under seed and the gross harvest of grain, instructions 
for harvest calculations, samples of forms and other 
documents are gathered in the fond of the Central State 
Commission for Determining the Productivity of the 
Harvest and Size of the Gross Harvest of Grains of 
the USSR Council of People's Commissars (f. 7589, 
567 files, 1932-1937). The Commission was formed 
in December 1932, to determine the area for seeding, 
the harvest and gross yield of grains and sunflower by 
raions, oblasts, republics, and the USSR as a whole. 
Documents generated by this Commission's activities 
contain information valuable for comparative analysis.
The fond of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(f. 9401) holds documents of the NKVD USSR from the 
1930s. Several series of documents deserve attention: 
correspondence with People's Commissariats, with 
republican and local organs of the NKVD on specific 
sensitive matters; orders; instructions; NKVD circulars, 
documents pertaining to operations (“special files”) of the 
NKVD Secretariat. This archive also holds documents 
reflecting the forced re-settlement of Ukrainians and 
special papers on the deportation of social and ethno- 
national population groups, mostly from the second 
half of the 1930s. In the course of 1930-1931, 63,720 
families were deported from Ukraine (19,658 to Northern 
Russia; 32,127 to the Ural region; 323 to Western and 
Eastern Siberia. From the Kuban were deported 38,404 
families, of these in particular, 25,995 to the Ural region. 
In connection with this, of importance are documents 
from the fond of the Main Administration of Places of 
Imprisonment MVD USSR (f. 9414, 7615 files); and, 
particularly, materials of the Main Administration of 
Camps of the USSR Council of People's Commissars 
for 1930-1934.
The Central Archive of the Federal Security Service 
of the Russian Federation holds specific documents that
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reflect the situation in the famine-stricken regions, for 
example, reports in detail, special records of the Secret- 
Political Section of the OGPU about the expulsion of 
kulaks in 1931, and on the progress of collectivization 
for 1931-1932. These are arranged according to a 
geographic principle (Ukraine, Belarus, Western oblast, 
the Central Chornozem area, Moscow oblast, Nizhegorod 
krai, Central Volga krai, the Ivanov industrial oblast, and 
others). Almost all these documents have information 
about Ukraine. The special function of these documents 
and their limited distribution (as a rule they are classified 
“Secret” or “Top Secret”) explain why here the word 
“famine” is widely used. This word was generally 
avoided in Party documents (at least in 1931-1932), 
despite the fact that they, too, were classified.
According to a report, dated June 12, 1931, of the 
Special Section OGPU, “On the Progress in Expelling 
Kulaks,” 3,089 families and 11,527 individuals are to 
be transported to Ural oblast. Boarding of seven trains 
has been completed, four have been “unloaded,” 55 
trainloads remain to be transported to their destination.34 
An explanatory note to these figures, behind which lie 
thousands of maimed human fates, indicates that most 
of the transports, while en route, were without food. 
The numbers of those who died and of those who were 
shot while trying to escape are given. In addition, the 
“tendency to escape while en route” is recognized as 
being endemic to Ukrainian kulaks.35 Another special 
report, “On the Progress of Expulsion of Kulak Families 
and Anti-Soviet Manifestations in Connection with the 
Expulsion,” dated July 17, 1931, cites the “negative” 
reaction on the part of the population: organization of 
armed resistance; flight; the suicides of entire families. 
A special report “On the Progress of Expulsion from 
Nizhno-Volga krai, Ukraine, and the North-Caucasus 
krai of the Kulak and Counter-Revolutionary Element 
that Hampers Grain Deliveries,” of January 14, 1933, 
tells of expulsions from Odesa oblast to the Northern 
krai of 2,172 persons; from Chernihiv oblast of 1,320, 
and 4,037 from Dnipropetrovs'k oblast.36
Another special report “On the Progress of 
Collectivization and the Mass Action of the Peasantry in 
1931 to January-March, 1932” attributes the famine in 
the Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovs'k, and Vinnytsia 
oblasts to “foodstuff problems,” cites 83 instances 
of swelling due to hunger, six deaths, consumption of 
carrion in twelve families, four cases of abandonment 
of children.37 These numbers, so obviously improbable, 
testify to how official reports minimized and distorted 
the true extent of the tragedy. Notice is also taken of
34. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 9, d. 539, l. 29-33.
35. Ibid.
36. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 11, d. 1310, l. 28-29.
37. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 10, d. 53, l. 1-64.
the unsatisfactory condition of draught resources, of 
emigrational tendencies in border regions, a drastic 
increase in the number of mass protests (253 in half a 
year). To safeguard grain deliveries, the GPU arrested 
836 persons on suspicion of participating in terrorist 
activities, and 327 for having committed terrorist acts. 
An addendum to a special report about the anti-kolkhoz 
movement and famine in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine 
and individual regions of the USSR testifies eloquently 
to the condition of the Ukrainian village in the first half 
of 1932. Against the background of information about 
cases of swelling and death through starvation, the 
report speaks of cannibalism and suicide brought on 
by hunger. “In terms of mass anti-Soviet occurrences, 
Ukraine stands in first place” (in the period January 1 to 
July 13, 1932, the GPU “registered” 923 overt instances 
of opposition).38 By identifying Ukraine, the hungry 
populace of which was supposedly preparing for an 
armed uprising, as the epicenter of a threat to the regime, 
Soviet functionaries were free to intensify the terror.
Other subjects are also common to these special 
reports by the GPU (for example, the refusal of individual 
farms to sow). According to the GPU's figures, in 1932, 
19,198 peasants in Kyiv oblast refused to sow; 13,090 in 
Dnipropetrovs'k and 8,180 in Vinnystia oblasts refused as 
well.39 Also found is the text of Yagoda's report, made by 
direct wire, about the destruction of a Ukrainian counter-
revolutionary organization in the Poltavska stanitsa in 
the Kuban and repressive measures by the GPU against 
the people of the stanitsa.40
A report from Yagoda to Stalin and Molotov, dated 
February 2, 1933, about the struggle against mass 
flight from the Ukr SSR, the North Caucasus krai, and 
the BSSR (f. 3, op. 30, d. 189) states that the transport 
sections of the OGPU have created screening and 
operational search groups. In the period January 22-30, 
18,379 Ukrainians were detained, most of whom were 
sent back, the remainder arrested. Another report states 
that on February 11-13, 2,377 persons were detained; 
2,354 were turned back, and 23 arrested (f. 3, op.30, d. 
189).
Apart from the archives already mentioned, 
documents related to the problem of the Holodomor 
are also to be found in other archives of the federal and 
regional level. Thus in the fonds of the Russian State 
Archive of Literature and Culture, which holds documents 
on the history of literature, social thought, music, theater, 
film, and painting, may be found information about the 
state of literature at that time, the honoraria paid to 
authors for “commissioned” works, and also diaries and 
inter-personal communication. Of particular interest for
38. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 11, d. 1449, l. 106-18.
39. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 11, d. 1449, l. 144-46.
40. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 11, d. 896, l. 77-78.
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researchers is Oleksander Dovzhenko's archive, which, 
however, is sealed until 2020.
Some fonds held in the Russian State Military 
Archive relate indirectly to the famine in Ukraine. There 
is, for example, the decision of the Council of People's 
Commissars of the RSFSR, “On the Organization of Red 
Army Kolkhozes,” of May 17, 1931, classified “Secret.” 
Other documents also deal with the same subject.
Documents bearing on the Holodomor in 
Ukraine are also found in regional archives. The State 
Archive of Sverdlovsk Oblast has information on 
the forced mobilization of peasants for work on the 
building of the giant projects of Stalin's Five-Year 
Plans: Magnitostroi, Uralugol, Uralstroiindustriia, 
Permtransles, Uralmashstroi, Khimstroi, and others. 
The 500,000 special re-settlers in early February 1932 
included Ukrainians as well (primarily from the Kuban). 
To survive they had to fulfill the norm: production of 
2-2.5 cubic meters of wood per day. For this the laborer 
received bread containing 90 percent sawdust. Failure to 
achieve the quota meant reduction of food to 75 percent, 
or to have it denied altogether.
The Documentation Center of the Recent History of 
Voronezh Oblast holds a notable quantity of documents 
about famine in regions that are today within the Russian 
Federation.
In the holdings of the Documentation Center of the 
Recent History of Krasnodar Krai documents for the 
period 1937-1991 are represented quite satisfactorily, 
but there are very evident gaps for the early 1930s and 
the period 1941-1945. Among the Center's documents 
declassified after 1991 are minutes and stenographic 
reports of Party conferences and plenums dealing with 
the introduction of collectivization, de-kulakization, 
expulsion of the inhabitants of Kuban stanitsas (f. 1, 
Kubano-Chernomorskii obkom).
It is impossible to describe in detail the composition 
and contents of the archival fonds mentioned here within 
the limits of this brief summary. Such an undertaking 
would require a systematic and focused examination that 
would culminate in a specialized annotated reference 
work. In passing one might mention the need to create an 
all-encompassing guide to the composition and contents 
of all archival fonds that contain information about the 
Holodomor. This guide should provide information on 
the archives in various countries and, given the wide 
geographic bounds this implies and the vastness of the 
information held, would require the efforts of not just 
one researcher, but the combined efforts of a group of 
scholars dedicated to this very purpose.
The need for a thematic reference work and archival 
guide stems from the state of public thinking about 
recognizing the Holodomor as genocide and also by 
the presence in Ukrainian and foreign historiography
of contrary interpretations of the historic sources used 
for the study of this problem. The parliaments of ten 
countries (the U.S., Canada, Estonia, Argentina, Australia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Georgia, and Poland) have recognized 
the Holodomor of 1932-1933 as an act of genocide 
against the Ukrainian people; the Ukrainian parliament 
also has officially recognized the Holodomor as genocide 
with the passing in November 2006 of the law “On the 
Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine.” This official 
recognition, however, has not solved the problem of the 
politicization of the issue and conflicting approaches to 
interpreting the information now available.
It is difficult not to agree with the conclusion 
reached by the Ukrainian scholar Vasyl' Marochko about 
the presence in the historiography of the Holodomor of 
a “conceptual diversity of thought and interpretation.”41 
While there are no particular differences in assessing 
collectivization, de-kulakization, the grain-delivery 
campaigns, and the deportation and repressions of the 
peasantry as the basic economic factors underlying the 
Famine, the positions of scholars regarding the political 
factors vary greatly. They range from seeing the 
Holodomor as the deliberate and intentional destruction 
of Ukrainians by the Communist regime to attenuating 
the Ukrainian tragedy, “diluting” it, by spreading it thinly 
among other republics.
A recent statement of the Russian view on the 
problem of the Holodomor in Ukraine can found in an 
article by Andrei Marchukov, a candidate of historical 
sciences. Marchukov tellingly titles his article “Operation 
‘Holodomor.'” Seeking to show that the “Holodomor is an 
ideological conception, a powerful instrument for acting 
on the mass consciousness,”42 the author concludes that 
“there are no serious arguments to support the concept of 
‘Holodomor.'”43
This statement alone testifies to the urgent need to 
create a reference guide to the archives, so that researchers 
are in a position to consult the primary sources as they 
seek the truth about the Holodomor.
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41. V. I. Marochko, “Suchasna zarubizhna istoriohrafiia holodu 
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